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In December 1997, 34 industrialized countries signed the Kyoto Protocol
committing to targets and timetables to reduce 6 greenhouse gases (GHGs).
Why were the only signatories industrialized countries?  Two reasons are
usually put forth.  The first is pragmatism, in that only this group, as opposed
to developing countries, can afford the costs of mitigating GHGs.  Still, this
explanation is imperfect since 12 of the signatories are transitional economies
of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union.  The second reason is fairness,
in that industrialized countries are responsible for the vast majority of the
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GHGs already built-up in the atmosphere and are responsible for over 60%
of the current emissions.  The fairness explanation is further supported by
the fact that “differentiation” was invoked in Kyoto, i.e., not all signatories
agreed to equal cutbacks, several citing special economic circumstances.
In the future, both pragmatism and fairness will be relevant to the question
of when and how developing countries will sign a global GHG agreement.
Another major influence will be the pursuit of economic efficiency or, at
least, cost-effectiveness, i.e., making sure that the targets are met at the lowest
global cost.  This can be fine-tuned in future agreements by the use of
incentive-based instruments and the timing of commitments.  Efficiency may
also be affected by relative burden-sharing, since this will influence the
number of countries that make mitigation commitments in the future.
The purpose of this paper is to analyze fairness, or equity, aspects of the
current Kyoto Protocol and its extension to a truly global agreement that
includes developing countries.  This is done in the context of a policy
approach gaining increasing favor—tradeable emission permits.  A dynamic
model of intercountry CO2 permit trading is used to address the following
questions:
1. To what extent does permit trading lower global CO2 mitigation costs?
2. How are intercountry welfare impacts influenced by alternative permit
distributions according to various equity criteria?
3. How might developing countries be brought into the agreement without
requiring CO2 reductions, yet promoting global efficiency gains by
utilizing their relatively lower cost mitigation capabilities?
4. To what extent does allowing for permit trading over time further lower
global mitigation costs?
5. How are intercountry welfare impacts distinguished by not just static
definitions of equity but also dynamic versions, such as sustainability
criteria?
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We acknowledge some of the limitations of this paper at the outset.  Only
one of the Kyoto GHGs is examined.  Also, policy-making over a 25-year
time horizon extending to the year 2035 is fraught with uncertainty, which
we do not address.  Finally, our model is dynamic in the sense that it allows
for intertemporal permit trading and changing benefits, but omits other
dynamic considerations such as technological change.
II.Equity and Global Warming Policy
A. Basic Definitions
In this paper we distinguish between static and dynamic definitions of
fairness, or equity.  The concept is usually applied across entities (hence
another synonym—distributive justice) in relation to important features of
the policy in question.  In the context of global warming policy the relevant
entities are countries.  For marketable permits the relevant features are the
initial allocation of permits, post-trading welfare outcome, or the process by
which the policy decisions are made.  Fairness in one area of the policy,
however, may have quite different implications in another, e.g., a principle
that gives all countries an equal proportion of permits in relation to their
initial emissions will not result in equal percentage emission reductions or
equal percentage welfare changes following trading.
Static equity refers to a given point in time, and in our context will be
referred to as intercountry equity.  Dynamic equity refers to the situation
over time, and is often referred to as intergenerational equity.  Below we
make a case for how these two concepts are separable from each other and
from efficiency considerations as well when the marketable permits approach
is used.
No universal agreement exists on the best definition of equity or even on
the base or objectives to which it should be applied.  Thus we explore the
implications of several alternatives that have been put forth in the literature.
Table 1 presents five static equity criteria, a general definition of each, a
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definition in the context of tradeable permits, and how each is made
operational in terms of permit distribution.1
Note that the first three criteria are all “allocation-based,” and are adapted
from established normative principles of philosophy, law, or economics.  On
the other hand, the “No Purchase” rule,2 often referred to as the “No Harm”
rule, has been put forth as an objective or “acceptable” criterion (see e.g.,
Barrett 1992; Edmonds et al., 1995), but it can be demonstrated that it
implicitly or explicitly involves value judgements, as do all distribution
principles.  For example, Rose et al. (1998) have explained how it is roughly
equivalent to a Rawlsian maximin criterion.  As we will demonstrate below,
this rule appears to have great promise in inducing developing countries to
join in a GHG protocol.
A good example of a purely ad hoc rule is the set of emission caps in the
Kyoto Accord.  These arose from the special pleadings of individual countries
to obtain differentiation in commitments (e.g., Australia—high dependence
on coal exports, New Zealand—long standing economic recession, Norway—
extensive hydroelectric energy base and limited options for further lowering
emissions, some transitional economies—economic decline due to
restructuring).  Although differentiation was intended to have a neutral
connotation, all of these reasons are appeals to fairness.
In recent years, dynamic equity has been dominated by the concept of
sustainable economic development, which has efficiency connotations as
well.  Like its static counterpart, there is no universal consensus on the
dynamic version, but one often used criterion is that each successive
generation be no worse off than its predecessor.  Of course, we limit this rule
to just the policy itself and not the entire development requirements per
country, i.e., net benefits of GHG mitigation per capita at time t +1 must be
1 For a discussion of how each distributional rule presented in Table 1, as well as several
others, can be given mathematical specificity and be formally modeled, see Rose et al. (1998).
2 The two rules are equivalent when only costs are taken into consideration.  When benefits
























































Table  1.   Alternative Fairness Criteria for Global Warming Policy
Criterion Basic Definition General Operational Rule Operational Rule for CO2 Permits
Sovereignty All nations have an equal Cut back emissions in a proportional Distribute permits in proportion to
right to pollute and to be manner across all nations emissions
protected from pollution
Egalitarian All people have an equal right Allow emissions in proportion Distribute permits in proportion to
to pollute or to be protected to population population
from pollution
Ability to Pay Abatement costs should vary Equalize abatement costs across Distribute permits to equalize
directly with national economic nations (gross cost of abatement as abatement costs (gross cost of
well-being proportion of GDP equal for each  abatement as proportion of
nation) a GDP equal for each nation) a
No Harm Some nations should not Poor countries should not be required Distribute permits to poor countries
(No Purchase) incur costs (Poor nations should to abate emissions equal to their baseline emissions
not have to buy permits)
Ad Hoc
(Kyoto Protocol) Abatement costs should be Give special consideration to economic Distribute permits according to
sensitive to unique circumstances health, fossil fuel dependence, special circumstances
(differentiation) prior abatement, etc.
a Gross cost refers to abatement cost only and does not include benefits or permit transactions.
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greater than or equal to those at time t.  Sustainability criteria generally have
both an economic and environmental connotation—the latter would require
that environmental quality be of no lesser quality for future generations in
each country.  This can be promoted by stabilization of atmospheric CO2
concentrations, which the Kyoto agreement caps were intended to help
achieve.  Therefore, we do not model this second requirement separately
(the reader is referred to Stevens and Rose, 1998, for such an analysis).
B. Advantages of Marketable Permits
The agreement reached at the Third Conference of the Parties to the
Framework Convention on Climate Change (COP-3) in Kyoto commits most
of the industrialized nations to emission caps for each of six major greenhouse
gases by the year 2010, as shown in the right-hand columns of Table 2.  In
addition, the agreement allows individual nations to achieve even lower
emissions and to bank their excess reductions for later use.  Countries can
also develop projects for joint implementation (JI) of GHG emissions (FCCC,
1997).
Tradeable greenhouse gas permits had been proposed prior to Kyoto (see,
e.g., Barrett et al.1992; Tietenberg and Victor, 1994), though only a few
limited features of this instrument will be included in the Protocol.
Economists familiar with permit trading will recognize the banking provision
of the agreement as a limited form of permit trading in which individual
nations can “sell” permits to themselves to be used in the future.  Joint
Implementation could also be viewed as another limited form of permit
trading, where all trades are along bilateral lines rather in a market with
many buyers and sellers.
Potentially sizeable gains in both efficiency and equity could arise from
establishing more open and complete permit markets as a feature of an
ultimate GHG treaty.  First steps toward an unrestricted market would include
permit transfers between at least the Annex I countries, credits for sponsoring
























































Table 2. Basic Data for Year 2010
GDPa Populationb CO2 Emissionsa           Mitigation Percentages
Country Level Growth Level Growth Level Growth 1990c 2010c 2020c  2035c
(Area) (billion $) Rate (million) Rate  (million t C) Rate
Africa 393.7 4.0 741.2 3.0 296.2 4.6 0.0   0.0   0.0  0.0
Aus/NZ 382.0 1.2 23.3 1.3 82.0 0.8 -7.0   1.2   8.8 19.0
Canada 642.4 1.2 28.7 0.8 117.3 0.5 6.0 10.6 14.9 21.1
China 653.5 6.0 1290.0 1.3 817.5 2.6 0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0
E-Europe 337.9 1.9 126.1 0.2 290.9 0.7 6.0  12.3 18.3 26.4
FSU 575.7 1.9 151.7 0.2 1084.5 0.7 0.0   6.8 13.0 21.7
India 414.6 5.0 1005.5 1.7 267.8 3.8 0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0
Japan 3315.7 1.2 127.3 0.3 310.9 0.8 6.0 13.2 19.8 28.9
L-America 1345.2 3.3 509.8 1.8 374.2 3.2 0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0
M-East 685.5 5.0 287.9 2.9 310.9 3.8 0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0
Asian Tigers 797.4 5.0 74.7 0.4 161.5 3.4 0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0
S-Asia 591.6 4.1 835.9 1.6 241.4 5.1 0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0
U.S. 6075.3 1.2 270.7 0.8 1354.9 0.5 7.0 11.5 15.8 21.9
W-Europe 7825.7 1.2 468.2 0.8 977.2 0.7 8.0 14.2 20.0 27.9
Total 24036.2 1.9 5941.0 1.6 6687.2 1.7 3.5d   6.9   9.2 10.9
a IPCC (1996); Nordhaus and Yang (1996).
b World Bank (1996).
c Base case where developing countries have not joined Kyoto Protocol.
d Reduction percentage for Annex I countries alone is 5.0%.
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as signatories.  Further steps would be to allow interregional trading and
trading of permits across time (including borrowing as well as banking).
The case for international trading of GHG permits rests on a well-known
theorem by Nobel laureate Ronald Coase (1960).  In this context, suppose
that a specific quantity of transferable greenhouse gas permits, determined
according to a GHG Protocol, is distributed without charge to its signatories.
The stock of permits effectively sets an overall cap on emissions.  Next assume
that countries are allowed to exchange permits in an open market.  This
effectively gives each country a stake in the environment, which is valued
by the market.  A country whose marginal abatement cost is higher than the
market permit price will buy permits from those countries whose marginal
abatement costs are below it.  When trading concludes, each country will
hold the economically efficient amount of permits (i.e., marginal abatement
costs across nations will be equal), independent of the initial distribution
permits to each country.3
From a global perspective, tradeable permits establish a valuable property
right that provides an incentive to protect the environment and to use it and
other resources efficiently.  At the same time, the equity implications of the
Coase Theorem are ambiguous.  Overall global wealth is maximized and is
identical regardless of how the permits are initially distributed, but equity is
highly dependent on the permit distribution (as well as on mitigation costs
and benefits).  This separability of efficiency and equity is another major
advantage of tradeable permits.  In many other approaches to policy making,
concerns exist that pursuit of equity will lead to disincentive effects, thereby
undercutting efficiency.  At the same time, separability has been used as an
excuse to ignore equity, since it has no bearing on the pursuit of what
economists consider the primary goal in most contexts.
3 This conclusion assumes that the transaction costs of permit trades are negligible and that
each country’s income is largely unaffected by the distribution of permits. Both assumptions
are reasonable in the context of transferable GHG permits (see Rose et al., 1998; Chao and
Peck, 1998).
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However, there are cases, such as international treaties, where global
efficiency may not be a rallying point and where equity instead may be
paramount (see, e.g., Rose, 1992; Manne and Richels, 1995).  This may very
well be the case for global climate change, where efficiency pursuits alone
may lead to major disparities in costs and benefits between countries.
Moreover, individual country welfare is not addressed directly by global
efficiency, but is subservient to what is often considered an abstract goal.
Countries are more likely to join in an accord that addresses their own welfare
and its relation to that of other countries directly.
Therefore, we can stand the traditional rationale for ignoring equity on
its head.  If efficiency is not affected by how permits are distributed, then let
us fine-tune the distribution in any way necessary to pursue equity objectives.
Interestingly, this pursuit will actually promote efficiency as well.  We
have taken for granted the issue of the comprehensiveness of the number of
parties to an agreement.  If more parties can be enticed into it by appealing
to their equity concerns, environmental quality will be further enhanced.  If
these parties have relatively lower abatement costs than the original
signatories, overall economic efficiency will be improved.
Note also that the Coase Theorem generalizes to the dynamic context.
Permit trading over time promotes even higher levels of efficiency by
capitalizing on abatement cost differentials in different periods.4  In this case
the permit price is determined not only by benefit and cost considerations in
the pure efficiency case (or simply cost considerations in the cost-
effectiveness case) but also by the fact that the permits represent a fixed
stock.  Thus, there is an intertemporal opportunity cost (user cost) that
influences their value.  As in the basic model of the extraction of a non-
renewable resource following Hotelling (see, e.g., Fisher, 1981), the price of
a permit will appreciate in conformance with the market rate of interest.
Buying and selling of GHG emission permits over time will be consistent
4 This stems from the fact that GHG abatement costs change over time; implicitly abatement
cost differentials are required in the static context to stimulate trading as well.
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with this outcome.5  Moreover, the dynamically efficient (post-trading)
outcome is unique and insensitive to the intercountry (static) or
intergenerational (dynamic) concepts of equity that might serve as the basis
for alternative permit distributions at a given point in time.
The overall stock of permits over time depends on the global abatement
requirement, which is derived from emission targets.  As long as costs do
not exceed benefits of increased tightening of this requirement overall, a
sustainability definition of intergenerational efficiency can be applied
globally.  Likewise, it is possible to apply this sustainability criterion to
individual countries through initial permit allocations or additional transfers.
Also, the intercountry equity rule agreed upon by the world body of nations
may change over time.  The separability of the Coase Theorem can further
be exploited in the dynamic context to fine-tune each of these considerations
individually.
III. Determinants of Permit Trading
The exchange of transferable greenhouse gas permits is a function of
differences in marginal abatement costs, which can stem from several sources.
The most obvious source of cost differentials is different marginal cost of
abatement (MCA) functions among countries.  However, even if two countries
had the same MCA functions, a cost differential would arise if they had
different emission reduction requirements (placing them at different points
on the function).  Thus trading would arise on this basis alone among Annex
I countries because of differences in Kyoto emission cap commitments.
Of course, there are differences in abatement cost functions among Annex
I nations, though these functions differ more significantly between the group
5 Various complications may modify this dynamic equilibrium result somewhat, e.g., the
possibility that low cost mitigation options will be used in early years, thereby leaving only
high cost options and thereby imposing additional costs upon the future (see, e.g., Rose et
al., 1999).
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of developing nations and the industrialized group (see, e.g., IPCC, 1996;
Halsnaes, 1996).  Permit exchanges among Annex I countries would reduce
the group’s total GHG abatement costs incurred by the Kyoto targets.  (The
abatement costs of individual sellers would increase, but would be more
than offset by permit revenues, and each country’s net benefits would increase
as well.)  It therefore follows that, if developing nations have MCA functions
that are generally lower than those of Annex I nations, finding a mechanism
for admitting them to the permits market (even by giving them permits equal
in number to their emissions every year) could effectively decrease global
abatement costs.
There are also likely to be differences in abatement costs over time.  With
the relatively long period over which mitigation would occur, technological
change could reduce these costs, perhaps substantially.  On the other hand,
rising abatement percentages over time (i.e., abatement levels relative to
uncontrolled greenhouse emissions) will increase MCA temporally.  In
addition, the discount rate will affect the perception of future costs.  In the
absence of technological change and rising abatement percentages, any
positive discount rate will reduce future MCA.
These dynamic considerations suggest the possibility that shifting
abatement from times when it is relatively expensive to times when it is
relatively cheap could reduce the present discounted value of global
abatement costs.  Interperiod trading of greenhouse permits could have two
forms of outcomes.  The first would allow for early abatement above the
required targets; the permits created by these excess emission reductions
could be “banked” and used in some future period.  This type of exchange
could be restricted so that the country creating the banked permits could be
the only nation to use them later, or they could potentially be sold for future
use by other nations.  From an economic perspective, banking only makes
sense if discounted MCA is lower in the present than in the future.  The
second option, permit “borrowing,” would result from the converse, i.e.,
discounted MCA being greater in the present than in the future, perhaps due
to technological change.  Under this outcome, it is cheaper to defer abatement
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to  the  future,  which  can  occur  when permits are transferred to the
present.6
Another dynamic consideration is the timing of commitments themselves.
Individual country welfare will, ceteris paribus, be higher, the longer emission
targets are deferred.  This ties timing to fairness as well.  However, total
global welfare will not be affected by timing of commitments, as long as all
countries are involved in permit trading during each year of the planning
horizon (a painless process under a No Harm/No Purchase rule for developing
countries), and as long as the cumulative stock of permits is fixed (again this
follows from the Coase Theorem).
An interesting question arises as to the relative prominence of each of
these motivations for trading.  This has important policy implications.  Climate
change negotiations are a source of tension between countries, and it would
help to have some advance knowledge of which factors are most effective at
reducing costs, so that these options can be the major focus of attention.
In addition, improvements in policy instrument design for the sake of
improving efficiency are likely to have differing implications for equity.  For
example, permit banking opportunities will favor some countries, while
borrowing will favor others.  The timing of abatement commitments for
developing countries will influence inter-country equity as well.  Often these
implications will accentuate the tensions, though potential problems may be
offset by additional transfers or a manipulation of permit assignments.
6 Interperiod trading, whether it involves banking or borrowing, adds one complication not
present in the interregional trading case.  Interperiod trading changes the time path of
greenhouse emissions, and hence changes when a warming will occur.  Again, for any positive
discount rate, this would affect the sum of the present discounted value of global benefits
over time, hence net benefits will change if interperiod trading is permissible.  Our analysis
suggest, however, the amount of interperiod trading is likely to be relatively small in
comparison to total global emissions.
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IV. Empirical Analysis
A. Alternative Simulations
In order to evaluate the relative prominence of the various determinants
of permit trading on efficiency and equity, we performed a number of
simulations.  They begin with the most basic institutional arrangement—
CO2 emission quotas for Annex I countries as set forth in the Kyoto Protocol—
and progress to the ultimate form—a globally comprehensive and fully
dynamic CO2 emissions trading system.  Essentially, each simulation
incorporates an additional feature in a step-wise manner as follows:
1. No-trading (Kyoto-based emission quotas for Annex I countries)
2. Trading by Annex I countries only (Kyoto-based tradeable quotas)
a. trading among countries or groups (interregional trading)
b. banking
c. banking and borrowing (complete interperiod trading)
d. interregional and interperiod trading
e. interregional and interperiod trading and intergenerational equity
3. Trading among Annex I countries and developing countries
(Kyoto-based tradeable quotas for Annex I; equity-based quotas for non-
Annex I)
a. interregional trading (No Harm)
b. banking
c. banking and borrowing
d. interregional (No Harm) and interperiod trading
e. timing of developing country commitments (Target Dates and
Sovereignty,/Egalitarian)
f. interregional and interperiod trading and intergenerational equity
The timing simulation merits further explanation.  Here we examine
welfare impacts of alternative commitment dates for groups of developing
countries.  Note first that in order to keep the number of simulations
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manageable, we have modeled only a single set of developing country
emission reduction levels.  In essence, we assume that the emission quota
for each developing country for the remainder of the time horizon will be
equivalent to that of its gross CO2 emissions at the start date of its commitment.
For example, if Argentina and other Latin American countries were to become
signatories to a GHG Protocol in the Year 2010, they would have no mitigation
requirement the first year, but would have to abate CO2 thereafter, invoking
the reasonable assumption of baseline emission growth.7 With respect to
timing, we divided developing countries into the following two groups based
on their per capita income (PCI):
Group A:  PCI > $1,000 Group B:  PCI < $1,000
Middle East China
Asian Tigers8 South Asia
Latin America India
Africa
We ran two simulations:  1) All developing countries commit to quotas
based on Year 2020 emissions, and 2) Group A developing country quotas
and the start of their commitments is the Year 2010, and Group B developing
country quotas and the start of their commitments is the Year 2020.  While
all of the above noted simulations have been run, only selected results are
presented and discussed in this paper (the reader is referred to Stevens and
7 There is an obvious problem associated with setting emission quotas on the basis of a
future year, since this provides no incentive to reduce emissions between now and that date,
and, in fact, every incentive to steer toward higher emissions.  It might be asked why we did
not use an earlier reference date such as 2000.  The reason relates to one of the major
developing country concerns about contributing to the effort to reduce GHGs—that Annex
I countries were able to achieve a high level of industrialization before they undertook the
burden of GHG control, and it would be unfair to ask developing countries to do so before
they reached a similar level (see, e.g., Agarwal and Narain, 1991).  In that regard, the Year
2010 may still be premature.
8 Asian Tigers include Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea, and Taiwan.
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Rose, 1998).  Our emphasis will be on issues of interregional equity and the
timing of commitments for developing countries.
Our simulations were performed with a dynamic non-linear programming
model consisting of the abatement cost and benefit functions for the 14
countries or country groups listed in Table 2.  The empirical base of the
model is an extension of that used in Rose and Stevens (1993) in three major
ways:  1) an extension to the entire globe and a finer delineation of countries,
2) an updated set of marginal abatement functions, and 3) an updated set of
marginal benefit functions.  The changes in the benefit functions are especially
noteworthy since they are tied to CO2 concentration levels through the Peck
and Teisberg (1994) reduced form climate equations.  For a more extensive
documentation of the model, the reader is referred to Stevens, Rose, and
Liao (1998).
B. Results
The results of selected simulations are presented in Tables 3-9, with a
comparative summary of these and other simulations presented in Table 10.9
The results from Table 3 represent the most basic outcome—fixed Kyoto
target emission levels (quotas) without any flexibility that would arise from
permit trading over time and space.10 The results indicate the present
9 The numerical results are in 1990 constant dollars, discounted to the Year 2010 by an
assumed 4% real discount rate.  Stating the results in 2010 dollars would require a forecast
of inflation between the present and 2010, which would likely be of dubious accuracy.  The
year 1990 was chosen because it is the base year for several key variables (e.g., emission
caps).  Adjustment to 1998 dollars would result in figures approximately 25% higher than
those presented.  Of course, none of these considerations would change the relative differences
of outcomes between countries or between different permit trading institutions.  Note also,
the results are presented for three selected (and in many cases) representative years.  A
summary table in the concluding section of this paper sums the results of each major
simulation over the entire planning horizon for a more proper comparison.
10 Net benefits are calculated as total benefits minus total abatement costs minus the value
of permit transfers.  Since a permit sale is a source of revenue, it is given a negative value.
Subtraction of a negative number yields a net addition to benefits.  A permit purchase is
treated as a cost or a net reduction in benefits.
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discounted value of the global net benefits of achieving the Kyoto targets
are increasingly positive over time even from this basic institutional
arrangement.  Mitigation costs increase, not because MCA functions shift,
but because emission caps under economic growth conditions require
movement to higher points on the functions.  Our results are based on the
premise that the marginal benefits of GHG abatement increase more rapidly
than the marginal costs, owing to the exponentially shaped damage functions
associated with radiaoctive forcing.11
Note that net benefits are negative for each of the Kyoto signatory groups,
though this figure never exceeds $2 billion for any of them until the Year
2035 (in the case of Western Europe).  The coexistence of these results with
positive global net benefits stems from the fact that the majority of benefits
are experienced by developing countries (see especially China and South
Asia), who at the same time do not incur the costs of GHG mitigation.
Allowing permit trading improves the situation from both the global and
individual country perspective (see Table 4). Gross benefits for each country
stay the same, but mitigation costs are lowered for each Annex I country
through trading.  In the Year 2010, all countries experience positive net
benefits except the U.S. and Western Europe, though these countries’ net
benefit deficit is lower than in the inflexible quota case.  Net benefits become
negative for other Annex I countries over the time horizon, but they are all
still better off than without intercountry permit trading. The U.S., Western
Europe, and Japan are the permit buyers in Year 2010, and the other three
Annex I groups being the sellers.  Approximately $3.1 billion of permits are
exchanged. This trading pattern is the same until the 2030s when Australia/
New Zealand become permit buyers. The global gains from trade are $2
billion in the first year (compare the total $24.84 billion in Table 4 with
$22.82 billion in Table 3). The gain dips in Year 2020 and then reaches more
than $2.5 billion (in constant dollars) in Year 2035.
11 We realize that this premise is debatable, and again emphasize the importance of the






























Table 4. Benefits and Costs of CO2, Mitigation with Interregional Permit Trading among Annex I Countries:
Kyoto Target Levels for Annex  I  Countries and No Mitigation for Developing Countries
(in  Year  2010  present  discounted  value)
2010 2020                 2035
Country                       Pre-Trading                        Post-Trading                           Post-Trading                             Post-Trading
(Area)
Benefit Cost NB Cost Permit $ NB Cost Permit $ NB Cost Permit $ NB
Africa   2.77 0.00 2.77 0.00 0.00   2.77 0.00 0.00   3.96   0.00 0.00   4.85
Aus/NZ   0.11 0.00 0.11 0.08 -0.13   0.16 0.14 -0.08   0.08   0.20 0.02  -0.03
Canada   0.19 0.21 -0.02 0.11 0.08   0.00 0.19 0.11  -0.07   0.26 0.09  -0.03
China   6.44 0.00 6.44 0.00 0.00   6.44 0.00 0.00   9.21   0.00 0.00 11.28
E-Europe   0.20 0.23 -0.03 0.78 -0.73   0.15 1.26 -1.17   0.16   1.62 -1.51   0.23
FSU   0.12 0.39 -0.27 2.00 -2.29   0.41 3.33 -2.95  -0.24   4.49 -3.24  -1.04
India   2.81 0.00 2.81 0.00 0.00   2.81 0.00 0.00   4.02   0.00 0.00   4.92
Japan   0.96 0.90 0.06 0.29 0.43   0.24 0.51 0.74  -0.06   0.73 1.00  -0.05
L-America   3.34 0.00 3.34 0.00 0.00   3.34 0.00 0.00   4.77   0.00 0.00   5.84
M-East   3.67 0.00 3.67 0.00 0.00   3.67 0.00 0.00   5.24   0.00 0.00   6.42
Asian Tigers   1.67 0.00 1.67 0.00 0.00   1.67 0.00 0.00   2.38   0.00 0.00   2.91
S-Asia   4.31 0.00 4.31 0.00 0.00   4.31 0.00 0.00   6.17   0.00 0.00   7.55
U.S.   1.63 2.62 -0.99 1.44 1.01  -0.82 2.42 1.04  -1.43   3.29 0.84  -1.28
W-Europe   2.26 3.30 -1.03 0.92 1.64  -0.29 1.58 2.34  -1.11   2.23 2.81  -1.08
Total 30.47 7.65 22.82 5.63 0.00 24.84 9.42 0.00 33.09 12.82 0.00 40.52
Note:  Permit price (real terms and discounted) in selected years:
2010:  $25.16/t C
2020:  $26.55/t C
2035:  $22.81/t C
Permit trading balance in each year equals 0 t C
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Banking reaps economic advantages as well, though the results are
somewhat difficult to assess from just the three selected years presented in
Table 5.12 They are better illustrated in the present value display for the entire
time horizon in Table 10.  The reason is that banking (or borrowing) alters
the pattern of gross and net benefits over time, thus making year-by-year
comparisons with earlier tables difficult. The results presented in Table 5
indicate that all Annex I countries find it advantageous to shift permits to
the future in the Year 2010 (negative signs indicate “selling” permits to
themselves). This raises net benefits in that year, but lowers them later in the
time horizon  in comparison to other years for the previous cases examined.13
Banking differs from a more flexible interperiod trading institution
because   it  requires  a  zero  or  positive  permit  account balance at all
times, whereas full interperiod trading allows individual nations to have a
negative permit account balance (borrowing). Although we do not display
these results, simulating interperiod trading among Annex I countries shows
that taking permits from the future and using them in the present is
advantageous, primarily for Canada, Japan, the U.S. and Western Europe.
Abatement costs typically decline over the 25 year time horizon for each of
these nations, implying that they can reduce present costs by using permits
that can be generated more cheaply at a later date.  However, the global
economic gains from this trading institution, compared to banking only, are
modest at best, in part because the reduction in costs affects only a few
12 For permit trading institutions in which permit banking or borrowing is allowed, we follow
the convention established for permit sales and purchases.  A banked permit has a negative
value, that is, it is treated as a sale to oneself or to a permit broker, and thus it is an addition
to net benefits.  The country or group of countries buys the permit back at some future date,
when it is treated as a cost.
13 Note also that interperiod trading results in a constant discounted permit price over the
planning period.  Again, this represents the intertemporal opportunity cost of utilizing a
permit at any given time.  The standard arbitrage equation of intertemporal optimization
requires that this price be constant, thus ensuring that any potential gains from shifting





























 Table 5.  Benefits and Costs of CO2  Mitigation with Permit Banking for Each Annex I Country:
Kyoto Target Levels for Annex I Countries and No Mitigation for Developing Countries
(in  Year  2010  present  discounted  value)
                                                                2010                                                                    2020                               2035
Country                     Pre-Banking                               Post-Banking                                 Post-Banking                      Post-Banking
(Area) Benefit Cost NB Benefit Cost Permit $ NB Benefit Cost Permit $ NB Benefit Cost Permit $ NB
Africa 2.77 0.00 2.77 2.96 0.00 0.00 2.96 3.96 0.00 0.00 3.96 4.75 0.00 0.00 4.75
Aus/NZ 0.11 0.00 0.11 0.12 0.06 -0.06 0.12 0.16 0.09 -0.01 0.08 0.19 0.14 0.05 0.00
Canada 0.19 0.21 -0.02 0.20 0.21 0.00 -0.01 0.27 0.30 0.00 -0.04 0.32 0.37 0.00 -0.05
China 6.44 0.00 6.44 6.88 0.00 0.00 6.88 9.21 0.00 0.00 9.21 11.05 0.00 0.00 11.05
E-Europe 0.20 0.23 -0.03 0.21 0.27 -0.02 -0.04 0.28 0.37 0.00 -0.09 0.34 0.50 0.00 -0.16
FSU 0.12 0.39 -0.27 0.13 0.81 -0.24 -0.45 0.17 1.11 -0.02 -0.92 0.20 1.61 0.15 -1.56
India 2.81 0.00 2.81 3.00 0.00 0.00 3.00 4.02 0.00 0.00 4.02 4.82 0.00 0.00 4.82
Japan 0.96 0.90 0.06 1.02 1.01 -0.08 0.10 1.37 1.49 0.03 -0.15 1.65 2.10 0.00 -0.46
L-America 3.34 0.00 3.34 3.57 0.00 0.00 3.57 4.78 0.00 0.00 4.78 5.72 0.00 0.00 5.72
M-East 3.67 0.00 3.67 3.92 0.00 0.00 3.92 5.24 0.00 0.00 5.24 6.29 0.00 0.00 6.29
Asian Tigers 1.67 0.00 1.67 1.78 0.00 0.00 1.78 2.38 0.00 0.00 2.38 2.86 0.00 0.00 2.86
S-Asia 4.31 0.00 4.31 4.61 0.00 0.00 4.61 6.17 0.00 0.00 6.17 7.40 0.00 0.00 7.40
U.S. 1.63 2.62 -0.99 1.74 2.63 -0.01 -0.88 2.33 3.57 0.00 -1.24 2.80 4.18 0.00 -1.39
W-Europe 2.26 3.30 -1.03 2.42 3.37 -0.05 -0.91 3.24 4.84 0.00 -1.60 3.88 6.01 0.00 -2.13
Total 30.47 7.65 22.82 32.54 8.36 -0.45 24.63 43.59 11.76 0.01 31.82 52.26 14.92 0.20 37.14
Note: Permit price (real terms and discounted) in all years: Aus/N.Z.:  $13.48/t C; Canada:  $21.72/t C; E-Europe:  $5.92/t C; FSU:  $7.36/t C;
Japan:  $35.13/t C; US:  $20.40/t C; W-Europe:  $33.57/t C.
Permit banking selected years: 2010:  44 million t C
2020:   2 million t C
2035:  -24 million t C
Permit banking balance for Annex I countries:  2010-2035 = 0 t C
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nations, and each nation’s discounted gross benefits are reduced in early
time periods and increased in later time periods.
Space limitations also do not allow us to display the full simulation results
for the case of both interregional and interperiod trading among Annex I
nations. These results are quite interesting in comparison to Table 4, the
interregional trading only case. For example, the present discounted value
of permits declines to $18.36 per ton of carbon.  The decrease in permit
prices reduces the value of permits sold by the FSU and increases number
(and hence the value of permits purchased by large buyers (both interregion
and interperiod) such as the U.S. and Western Europe.  The opportunity to
borrow permits from the future brings down the price of permits, thereby
improving the net benefits of buyers and diminishes it for sellers, even though,
for example, the FSU sells about 100,000 more tons of carbon (in comparison
to the results in Table 4) both 2010 and 2035.  Globally, net benefits are
higher by about $.5 to $1 billion dollars annually.
The results of the inclusion of developing countries into permit trading
are extremely interesting as presented in Table 6.  Global gains and net benefits
become quite large, reaching more than $50 billion in 2035, a $12 billion
increase over the base case in Table 3.  Interestingly, however, some Annex
I countries stand to be worse off from the admission of developing countries
in comparison to the counterpart Annex I only case (Table 5), since they lose
their comparative advantage in permit selling.  For example, Eastern Europe
and the former Soviet Union now for the most part become permit buyers
rather than permit sellers.  They still are better off than under the inflexible
quota system;  however, their gains from lower mitigation costs are not as
high as their now forgone gains from permit selling.  Still, this should not
overshadow the large global gains.  Essentially net benefits are increased
dramatically by bringing development countries (DCs) into the permit trading
process.  At the same time, DCs can gain experience in permit trading at
“No Harm” to themselves, i.e., they can choose not to sell any permits if they
are apprehensive.  However, they will eventually realize that some permits





























 Table 6.  Benefits and Costs of  CO2  Mitigation with Interregional Permit Trading among Annex I Countries and
Developing Countries: Kyoto Target Levels for Annex I Countries and No Harm for Developing Countries
(in  Year  2010  present  discounted  value)
                                                           2010                                                               2020                                           2035
Country               Pre-Trading                           Post- Trading                             Post- Trading                               Post- Trading
(Area)   Benefit Cost NB Benefit Cost Permit $ NB Benefit Cost Permit $ NB Benefit Cost Permit $ NB
Africa 2.77 0.00 2.77 2.77 0.11 -0.22 2.88 3.96 0.18 -0.37 4.15 4.85 0.24 -0.48   5.09
Aus/NZ 0.11 0.00 0.11 0.11 0.02 -0.02 0.12 0.14 0.02 0.04 0.08 0.19 0.01 0.08   0.10
Canada 0.19 0.21 -0.02 0.19 0.02 0.09 0.07 0.23 0.03 0.12 0.08 0.33 0.02 0.12   0.19
China 6.44 0.00 6.44 6.44 0.30 -0.60 6.74 9.21 0.42 -0.85 9.64 11.28 0.40 -0.81 11.69
E-Europe 0.20 0.23 -0.03 0.20 0.16 0.07 -0.03 0.24 0.18 0.16 -0.10 0.35 0.13 0.24 -0.03
FSU 0.12 0.39 -0.27 0.12 0.39 -0.01 -0.27 0.15 0.46 0.48 -0.80 0.21 0.33 0.90 -1.02
India 2.81 0.00 2.81 2.81 0.10 -0.20 2.91 4.02 0.15 -0.31 4.18 4.92 0.18 -0.36   5.11
Japan 0.96 0.90 0.06 0.96 0.06 0.33 0.57 1.19 0.07 0.49 0.63 1.68 0.05 0.52   1.11
L-America 3.34 0.00 3.34 3.34 0.29 -0.60 3.65 4.77 0.43 -0.90 5.24 5.84 0.45 -0.93  6.33
M-East 3.67 0.00 3.67 3.67 0.31 -0.65 4.00 5.24 0.49 -1.02 5.77 6.42 0.55 -1.15   7.02
Asian Tigers 1.67 0.00 1.67 1.67 0.04 -0.09 1.71 2.38 0.07 -0.14 2.45 2.91 0.07 -0.15   2.99
S-Asia 4.31 0.00 4.31 4.31 0.19 -0.39 4.51 6.17 0.34 -0.70 6.53 7.55 0.46 -0.95   8.05
U.S. 1.63 2.62 -0.99 1.63 0.27 1.13 0.23 2.02 0.32 1.47 0.24 2.86 0.22 1.44   1.19
W-Europe 2.26 3.30 -1.03 2.26 0.17 1.15 0.94 2.80 0.21 1.54 1.06 3.96 0.15 1.53   2.28
Total 30.47 7.65 22.82 30.47 2.43 0.00 28.04 42.51 3.36 0.00 39.15 53.34 3.25 0.00 50.09
Note:  Permit price (real terms and discounted) in selected years:
2010:  $10.79/t C
2020:  $9.35/t C
2035:  $5.63/t C


























































Table 7.  Benefits and Costs of  CO2  Mitigation with Interperiod and Interregional Permit Trading among Annex I
Countries and Developing Countries: Kyoto Target Levels for Annex I Countries and No Harm for Developing Countries
(in  Year  2010  present  discounted  value)
                                                             2010                                                               2020                                           2035
Country                Pre- Trading                        Post- Trading                       Post- Trading                        Post- Trading
(Area)   Benefit Cost NB Benefit Cost Permit $ NB Benefit Cost Permit $ NB Benefit Cost Permit $ NB
Africa 2.77 0.00 2.77 3.29 0.18 -0.76 3.87 4.20 0.22 -1.30 5.27 4.07 0.14 -1.97 5.90
Aus/NZ 0.11 0.00 0.11 0.13 0.03 -0.08 0.18 0.17 0.02 0.11 0.04 0.16 0.01 0.46 -0.30
Canada 0.19 0.21 -0.02 0.22 0.04 0.21 -0.03 0.28 0.03 0.37 -0.12 0.27 0.01 0.68 -0.42
China 6.44 0.00 6.44 7.65 0.48 -2.10 9.26 9.77 0.50 -2.95 12.22 9.47 0.24 -3.35 12.58
E-Europe 0.20 0.23 -0.03 0.23 0.26 -0.06 0.03 0.30 0.22 0.39 -0.31 0.29 0.08 1.58 -1.38
FSU 0.12 0.39 -0.27 0.14 0.64 -0.61 0.11 0.18 0.55 1.25 -1.62 0.17 0.20 5.52 -5.54
India 2.81 0.00 2.81 3.34 0.16 -0.69 3.87 4.27 0.19 -1.09 5.17 4.14 0.11 -1.47  5.50
Japan 0.96 0.90 0.06 1.14 0.09 0.82 0.22 1.45 0.08 1.52 -0.14 1.41 0.03 2.85 -1.47
L-America 3.34 0.00 3.34 3.96 0.47 -2.09 5.58 5.06 0.52 -3.10 7.65 4.91 0.28 -3.90  8.53
M-East 3.67 0.00 3.67 4.35 0.50 -2.24 6.09 5.56 0.58 -3.51 8.50 5.39 0.34 -4.86  9.91
Asian Tigers 1.67 0.00 1.67 1.98 0.07 -0.31 2.22 2.53 0.08 -0.48 2.92 2.45 0.04 -0.61  3.01
S-Asia 4.31 0.00 4.31 5.12 0.31 -1.35 6.17 6.54 0.40 -2.40 8.55 6.35 0.28 -3.97 10.03
U.S. 1.63 2.62 -0.99 1.94 0.45 2.69 -1.20 2.47 0.38 4.46 -2.37 2.40 0.14 8.13 -5.86
W-Europe 2.26 3.30 -1.03 2.69 0.29 2.88 -0.48 3.43 0.25 4.77 -1.58 3.33 0.09 8.41 -5.17
Total 30.47 7.65 22.82 36.18 3.96 -3.67 35.90 46.21 4.01 -1.97 44.17 44.81 1.99 7.50 35.31
Note: Permit price (real terms and discounted) in all years:  $29.68/t C;
Permit trading selected years: 2010:  -124 million t C
2020:    -66 million t C
2035:   253 million t C































Table 8.  Benefits and Costs of  CO2  Mitigation with Interperiod and Interregional Permit Trading among
 Annex I  Countries and Developing Countries: Kyoto Target Levels for Annex I  Countries and
All  Developing Countries Commit to Quotas based on Year 2020 Emissions,
Sovereignty Criterion Allocation vs. Egalitarian Allocation for Developing Countries
(in  Year  2010  present  discounted  value)
                           Sovereignty  2035                                                                           Egalitarian  2035
Country                                              Post- Trading                                                                                  Post- Trading
(Area) Benefit Cost Permit $ NB Benefit Cost Permit $ NB
Africa   7.02 0.82 2.60   3.61   7.02 0.82 0.47 5.74
Aus/NZ   0.28 0.05 0.12   0.11   0.28 0.05 0.12 0.11
Canada   0.47 0.06 0.19   0.22   0.47 0.06 0.19 0.22
China 16.34 1.39 4.43 10.52 16.34 1.39 5.45 9.49
E-Europe   0.50 0.45 0.05   0.00   0.50 0.45 0.05 0.00
FSU   0.30 1.16 0.69  -1.55   0.30 1.16 0.69 -1.55
India   7.14 0.61 1.94   4.59   7.14 0.61 -1.68 8.20
Japan   2.43 0.18 0.90   1.36   2.43 0.18 0.90 1.36
L-America   8.47 1.45 0.61   6.41   8.47 1.45 1.95 5.07
M-East   9.30 1.69 -0.23   7.83   9.30 1.69 2.02 5.59
Asian Tigers   4.22 0.26 1.24   2.73   4.22 0.26 3.35 0.62
S-Asia 10.95 1.48 0.62   8.85 10.95 1.48 -0.36 9.83
U.S.   4.14 0.80 2.18   1.16   4.14 0.80 2.18 1.16
W-Europe   5.74 0.54 2.63   2.57   5.74 0.54 2.63 2.57
Total 77.30 10.92  17.95 48.42 77.30 10.92 17.95 48.42
Note: Permit price (real terms and discounted) in all years:  $11.73/t C;
Permit trading selected years: 2010:   -471 million t C
2020:   -640 million t C
2035:  1,531  million t C
Permit trading balance:  2010-2035 = 0 t C
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Table 7 illustrates the simulation results for interregional and interperiod
trading among the Annex I and developing nations.  Net benefits for nations
such as the U.S. and the FSU are lower for all three years, and higher for
nations and regions such as China and Latin America, in comparison to
previous results.  For example, China’s net benefits increase by $2.52 billion
and $1.4 billion in 2010 and 2035, while  and Latin America’s net benefits
are greater by $1.93 and $2.79 billion, respectively.  Globally, net benefits
are greater in 2010 and 2020, though they are lower in 2035.
Table 8 shows simulation results in 2035 from two different distributions
of permits to developing countries, based on Year 2020 emission cap for
these countries as a whole, while Annex I countries continue to meet the
Kyoto targets.  The Sovereignty equity criterion distributes permits to
developing nations such that each nation’s percentage reduction in
greenhouse gases is equal to the percentage reduction of the entire group of
developing nations.  The Egalitarian equity criterion distributes the stock of
permits available to the developing nations according to relative population
shares after 2020.  Table 8 shows that countries or regions with relatively
high population growth rates, such as Africa (3% population growth) are
better off relative to regions such as Latin America (1.8% growth) or the
Asian Tigers (.4% growth).  For example, Latin America’s net benefits are
lower by $1.34 billion in 2035 under the Egalitarian allocation than under
the Sovereignty allocation.  Since equilibrium abatement costs are unaffected
by different permit distributions (recall the Coase Theorem), all of the decline
is due to Latin America’s smaller initial permit holdings and the subsequent
increase in the purchase of permits.
The timing of greenhouse gas abatement commitments for non-Annex I
countries is a potentially contentious issue.  Table 9 shows simulation results
from a case in which the Middle East, the Asian Tigers and Latin America,
all countries with per capita incomes exceeding $1,000 per year, are brought
into a greenhouse permits market in 2010 with permit allocations equivalent
to emissions in 2010.  The remaining developing nations are brought into
the permits market in 2020, with initial permit allocations equal to emissions
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in 2020.  Interregional and interperiod permit trading are allowed.  One
immediate result from this global agreement is that it increases the global
supply of permits, relative to those cases where all developing nations are
brought into the permits market in 2020 because the countries that enter the
permit market have greater emissions in 2020 than in 2010.  The increased
permit supply drives permit prices down, and globally net benefits rise.  In
comparison to Table 7, which differs only by the timing of greenhouse
commitments, net benefits for Latin America and the Middle East are lower
in 2010, 2020 and 2035, with the disparity the largest in 2035.  For example,
Latin America’s net benefits are reduced by $1.72 billion and the Middle
East is worse off by $2.28 billion.  The Asian Tigers would experience an
increase in net benefits, for example, in 2035, net benefits would rise by
$.49 billion.
Our final policy simulation—incorporation of an intergenerational equity
criterion—did not yield a feasible solution.  This is due to a combination of
factors affecting Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, which are
such that it is impossible for these regions to achieve positive net benefits
for every year of the planning horizon.  The factors include the stringency of
emission reduction requirements, low level of benefits, and high level of
costs relative to those of other countries/regions.  It appears that if a strict
definition of intergenerational equity is imposed, it would be necessary to
provide some relief from the Kyoto emission caps for these countries or to
provide them with cash transfers.
Figure 1 shows net benefits for each nation or region over the model time
horizon for the simulation in Table 10.  Though net benefits are negative for
the FSU and Eastern European nations from 2010 to 2035, other countries
would experience positive net benefits.  For regions such as Africa, Southeast
Asia, and India, net benefits begin declining as early as 2024.  All of these
regions are initially permit sellers whose sales decline over time, until
eventually these countries become permit buyers.  This effect outweighs the
increase in gross benefits from rising greenhouse gas abatement, thus their





























Table 10. Summary of Permit Trading Simulations, 2010 to 2035a
 Country Kyoto Kyoto+ Kyoto+ Kyoto Kyoto + Kyoto + Kyoto +
(Area) (Fixed Quotas Interregional Interperiod Interregional All Timing + All Timing + All Timing
for Annex I) (Annex I Only) (Annex I Only) (No Harm for DCs 2020 DCs 2020 (Group A 2010
for DCs) (Sovereignty) (Egalitarian) Group B 2020)
Africa 104.00 104.79 104.73 109.17 137.13 166.05 146.92
Aus/NZ 1.49 1.77 1.66 2.71 4.05 4.05 4.54
Canada -0.94 -0.58 -0.91 3.61 5.48 5.48 7.38
China 241.96 243.78 243.64 252.85 329.98 308.99 364.30
E-Europe -2.70 4.81 -2.68 -1.02 -0.52 -0.52 -5.59
FSU -26.95 -10.95 -26.69 -19.68 -28.11 -28.11 -41.73
India 105.68 106.47 106.41 110.00 144.70 201.56 157.58
Japan -5.31 2.70 -5.28 23.18 34.86 34.86 45.87
L-America 125.39 126.34 126.27 136.40 182.65 160.49 163.25
M-East 137.72 138.76 138.69 150.65 207.58 171.73 182.80
Asian Tigers 62.54 63.01 62.98 64.53 85.21 53.65 87.85
S-Asia 162.08 163.31 163.21 171.86 238.12 262.89 240.33
U.S. -32.38 -28.68 -31.63 20.16 31.01 31.01 49.43
W-Europe -43.40 -18.12 -42.61 44.93 67.58 67.58 97.39
Global NB 829.18 897.41 837.79 1069.33 1439.73 1439.73 1500.32
Incremental
NB Increase —  68.23  -59.63  231.55  370.40  0.00  60.60
Cumulative
NB Increase —  68.23  8.60  240.15  610.54  610.54  671.14


























































FIGURE 1.  NET BENEFIT OF CO2 MITIGATION: KYOTO TARGET LEVELS FOR ANNEX I COUNTRIES, 
GROUP A COUNTRIES COMMIT TO QUOTAS BASED ON YEAR 2010 EMISSIONS AND 







































Figure 1. Net Benefit of CO2 Mitigation: Kyoto Target Levels for Annex 1 Countries, Group A Countries Commit
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V. Conclusion
The marketable permits approach to global warming policy can have many
variants depending on the number of countries included, whether permits
can be traded over time, the timing of mitigation commitments themselves,
and the manner in which the permits are distributed among countries.  The
latter two features address equity head on, although the first two features,
usually motivated by efficiency gains, have equity implications as well.  This
is important from a normative standpoint but also in regard to the political
viability of any greenhouse gas treaty proposal.
Table 10, which summarizes our main simulations, illustrates these points.
Comparisons are facilitated by the fact that net benefits are summarized over
the entire policy time horizon rather than the previous presentations of just
three selected (and sometimes unrepresentative) years.
Even if trading is limited only to Annex I countries, global net benefits
rise because trading reduces the cost of meeting the Kyoto targets.
Interestingly, modifying the permits institution to allow trading across Annex
I countries and across time is also better than a system of fixed quotas but
diminishes global net benefits compared to interregional trading only.  The
reason is that several countries find it personally advantageous to defer
emission reductions to a later date, thereby reducing near-term benefits to
everyone else.
Much larger gains from interregional permit trading are available if
developing nations are granted transferable permits in an amount equivalent
to their emissions in 2010 (and subsequent years).  The developing nations
are made no worse off, even if they choose not to sell any of their permits,
and they gain the opportunity to profit from permit sales from ready trading
partners among the Annex I nations.  These incremental gains are $231 billion
over the model time horizon, again due to the reduction in abatement costs
among the industrialized nations.
The two simulations for different permit distributions according to
Sovereignty and Egalitarian equity rules indicate another large global gain
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due primarily to requiring developing countries to commit to GHG emission
targets before the end of the policy horizon, and at the same time delaying
their entrance into the permits market (the simulation does not include the
No Harm option from 2010 to 2020).  These simulations differ from the
Kyoto interregional trading case in that we have also incorporated interperiod
permit trading.  However, this factor alone accounts for little more than a $5
billion incremental increase in net benefits; hence, the inclusion of developing
country mitigation commitments is responsible for most of the incremental
gain of $370 billion.  Obtaining these commitments, even though delaying
the entrance of developing nations into the permits market, effectively reduces
the total supply of permits over the model time horizon by 10 years worth of
emissions from these countries.  The ensuing abatement increases benefits
more than it increases costs in comparison to the previous cases.   We did
not investigate whether delaying entrance of the developing nations until
later years would have a similar effect on global net benefits, but there is
every indication from our data that it would.
Finally, there is a slight gain of $61 billion in securing commitments from
Latin America, the Middle East, and the Asian Tigers in 2010 instead of
2020.  We take this to imply that, while it is important to consider the timing
of including developing nations in a greenhouse protocol, fine-tuning the
dates among non-Annex I nations may only result in small increase in global
net benefits.  The reason is that the Group A developing countries (those
with per capita incomes exceeding $1,000) have relatively high abatement
cost functions.
In summary, the greatest efficiency gains in the design of a GHG tradeable
permit policy stem from utilizing the low-cost mitigation options of
developing countries (even if no additional mitigation is forthcoming from
this group itself) and then from requiring emission reductions from developing
countries at some future date.  Interestingly, interperiod permit trading
(banking or borrowing) yields relatively small incremental gains.  The first
of the more worthwhile extensions of the Kyoto accord are consistent with
many nations’ conception of equity at present (i.e., “No Harm” rule), while
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the second is likely to become embroiled in some equity controversies, which
will be decided to a great extent on the basis of the timing of these additional
commitments.
We have also uncovered two ironies in the dynamic context.  The first
relates to the fact that a given country acting in pursuit of its own objectives
might shift its mitigation temporally so as to lower net benefits to other
countries.  Also, net benefits could be increased more by having the poorest
developing countries commit to emission caps first, since they have relatively
lower mitigation costs and higher mitigation benefits, and then later including
the top tier of countries, such as Latin America and the Asian Tigers.
However, equity considerations are likely to override such a timing decision.
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